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*SWW file*

29 September 1969


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, COMIREX

SUBJECT: Rapid Readout and Reporting of  
Imagery for Warning and Indica-  
tions Intelligence Purposes

1. In my memorandum to you of 25 July 1969, same subject, I undertook to conduct a review of recent OAKS in order to identify those types of items which would benefit from accelerated and selective dissemination for indications/warning purposes.


2. Attached hereto is a report I have just received from the Director, National Indications Center in which he outlines some of the information which would be of value to him. Also, it is his finding that the products of the photo interpreter at NPIC have substantial potential for warning and indications.

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AD/DCI/NIPE

Attach:



OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

Sent to COMIREX under  
COMIREX-D-13.7/7, dated  
1 October 1969



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GROUP 1  
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NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER  
Room 1 E 821  
Pentagon

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26 September 1969

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC WARNING WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: Rapid Readout and Reporting of Imagery for Warning and Indications  
Intelligence Purposes

Reference: Memorandum for Chairman, COMIREX of 25 July 1969

1. The initial reaction to the referenced memorandum was to comment that the analysis and reporting of indications and warning type material from satellite photography is both rapid and pertinent to the needs of NIC and the Watch Committee. The major area for improvement lies in increased frequency and flexibility of launchings so that exploitable information becomes available when the need is greatest. Such corrective action is beyond the scope of this paper, however, and an attempt has been made to offer guidance for added refinement of the reporting which occurs once the film is available for exploitation.

2. The OAKs and cable version of the initial readout generally include information on developments which relate to the warning problem. However, the following suggested kinds of activity and changed situations are offered as a further refinement of that process which might assist in pinpointing the needs of the NIC. Analysts at NPIC should be encouraged to report on a preliminary basis what to them appears unusual or significant regardless of whether it fits into their list of specific targets or other criteria for reporting. It may well be the unpredictable anomaly or deviation from normal procedures which the experienced photo interpreter would detect and recognize that will provide a tip-off that military activity is pending.

3. Among the predictable kinds of abnormal activity of interest to the NIC are the following:

## a. Air Forces

- Large or unusual deployments of airborne transport aircraft. Example--concentration of AN-12s at Baltic airfields prior to invasion of Czechoslovakia.
- Absence of airborne transports from their home bases.
- The deployment of substantial numbers of special purpose aircraft to areas of tension. Example--Fishbed H reconn at 5 airfields near the Sino-Soviet border.

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- The appearance of 21 MIG fighters at Hailaerh airfield in northwest Manchuria, the first noted there since 1962.
- Airfield construction. Example--Nine Soviet airfields being built or improved near the Sino-Soviet border.
- b. Navy
  - Significant change in number and types of submarines at Northern Fleet or Pacific Ocean Fleet bases.
  - Significant increase or decrease in numbers of missile containers at nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine forces or at missile storage facilities.
  - Heavy concentrations of merchant ships or stockpiling of military cargo at Nikolaev, Vladivostok or Haiphong.
- c. Ground Forces
  - Mobilization and concentration of civilian vehicles at or near military installations.
  - Expansion or relocation of ground force divisions near an area of tension. Example--Such as along Sino-Soviet border or in Western Soviet MDs in June and July 1968.

4. The foregoing examples are illustrative of information which has become available from satellite photography. If it is feasible to disseminate such information to the NIC, and the CIA and DIA operations centers in preliminary form more rapidly than is now possible in the more complete and more thoroughly analyzed version, there would be some gain to the indications and warning activities. The preliminary and provisional nature of this advance information might preclude using it widely or for publication but it would provide a basis for alerting other collection mechanisms or sensors and for a re-look at other information already at hand but where significance may have been less than convincing.

5. In sum, the products of the photo interpreter at NPIC have substantial potential for warning and indications. In an area such as the Sino-Soviet border, there is distressingly little US capability to collect information by any other means except for infrequent and fragmentary glimpses. In view of the demonstrated high-level interest

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in developments in such areas, rapid exploitation and dissemination of the products of photo intelligence is increasingly helpful, especially to those components of the intelligence community which are charged with providing warning of situations which may necessitate decisions or other actions by high officials in the US government.

*Melvin I. Hendrickson*

MELVIN I. HENDRICKSON

Director

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